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Dewberry: Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction
NOTES
SECTION 1983 AND FEDERALISM:
THE BURGER COURT'S NEW DIRECTION*
INTRODUCTION

Section 1983 grants a civil cause of action for damages or equitable
relief against persons who, acting "under color" of state law, deprive the
plaintiff of "rights, privileges or immunities" extended by the laws of the
Constitution of the United States.' Enacted more than a century ago against
the backdrop of the widespread breakdown in law enforcement and the
terrorism of vigilante groups against black citizens in the Reconstruction
South, the broadly phrased statute has been judicially developed into a
pervasive remedy of national scope. The expansion of the remedy by the
federal courts has lead to its use in a wide variety of cases alleging deprivations of rights by state authorities.
This proliferation of section 1983 suits has brought into focus important
concerns regarding the scope and availability of the remedy. The primary
underlying concern is the issue of federalism implicit in section 1983 actions.
Suits against state officials concerning state policies or other areas of important
state interests are now being litigated in federal courts under section 1983
to the virtual exclusion of state courts and administrative processes. In addition, the sheer number of actions filed each year poses a significant burden
2
on the docket of the lower federal courts. The concerns of federal-state
comity and federal caseload burdens are accentuated by the confusion regarding
the nature of the substantive rights that section 1983 should protect in its
modern application.
For these reasons, the need for clarification and reduction of the remedy's
present scope has become clear. Although legislative change has been advocated,
future congressional reform to reduce the judicial expansion of the statute is
unlikely. The Supreme Court, however, has recently employed a more restrictive analysis of section 1983, which, if continued, will have a significant
impact on the scope of section 1983 jurisdiction.
After briefly tracing the historical background and early development of
the section 1983 remedy, this note analyzes the modern expansion of the
statute through discussion of the Supreme Court's major decisions from 1939
to 1972. The problems generated by this expansion are also examined. Next,
the note focuses on the developing trend in more recent Supreme Court cases
toward a retrenchment in section 1983 analysis that would restrict the present
scope of the remedy. Finally, the note suggests the possible future direction of
Supreme Court analysis.
OEDITOR'S NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in the Spring 1976 quarter.

1. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1974).
2.
3.

See text accompanying notes 86-90 infra.
See text accompanying notes 111-183 infra.
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SECTION 1983 AND FEDERALISM

SECTION 1983
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution and Laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.4
Originally enacted as section one of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 5 42
U.S.C. section 1983 represented an early exercise of the power of Congress
under section five of the fourteenth amendment to enforce the amendment's
provisions. 6 The legislation was enacted in response to a congressional message
from President Grant deploring the lawless conditions in the southern states
resulting from the violence of such organizations as the Klan against black
citizens and Northern sympathizers. 7 These violent activities were supported
actively and tacitly by local law enforcement authorities8 whose deliberate inaction was viewed by proponents of the Ku Klux Klan legislation as a denial
of equal protection of the laws to the victims of the violence. 9 The legislation
was aimed, therefore, not at the perpetrators of the violence but against those
individuals acting "under color" of state law. Its overriding purpose, as later
interpreted by the Supreme Court, was to "afford a federal right in federal
courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies."' 0

4. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1974).
5. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22 17 Stat. 13.
6. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONs-r. amend XIV, §. "The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §5.
7. "A condition of affairs now exists in some states of the Union rendering life and
property insecure. . . . That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of
state authorities I do not doubt. . . . Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation
as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and
the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States." Message of March 23, 1871,
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 274 (1871).
8. "While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynching and
banishment have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations
have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective. . . . Immunity
has been given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are searched in vain
for any evidence of effective redress." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 274 (1871) (remarks
of Mr. Lowe of Kansas).
9. Id. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175 (1961).
10. 365 U.S. at 180. See further discussion of Monroe at text Accompanying notes 26-44
infra.
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Opponents of the legislation decried the "transfer [of] another large portion of jurisdiction from the state tribunals ...

to those of the United States.""

Regarding the broad scope of the legislation, one opponent declared that:
"[A federal action would be created] without any limit whatsoever as to
amount in controversy. The deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable
character ...merely nominal damages; and yet by this section jurisdiction
of that civil action is given to the federal courts instead of its being prosecuted
as now in the courts of the states."' 2 These fears have been realized. From
its specific post-Civil War origins, the statute after decades of disuse has been
expanded within the past 15 years to a pervasive remedy of national scope.
Early Development
The section 1983 remedy was moribund during the post-Reconstruction
period and the first four decades of this century, 13 primarily because of the
restrictive interpretation placed on the scope of the fourteenth amendment
by the Supreme Court." The cases reaching the Court from 1915 to 1939
involved deprivations of the voting rights of black citizens under unlawful
state statutes;' 5 the Court focused on fourteenth and fifteenth amendment deprivations, avoiding discussion of the scope of the section 1983 remedy itself.
Modern Development
The modern era of section 1983 analysis began in 1939 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Hague v. Council of Indus. Organizations16 Seeking
injunctive relief, plaintiff labor organizers alleged that city officials, acting
pursuant to unlawful local ordinances, had interfered with the plaintiffs'
rights to distribute union literature and hold organizational meetings.- In
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 50 (1871) (remarks of Mr. Kerr of Indiana).
12. Id. App. 216 (remarks of Mr. Thurman of Ohio). Some critics have suggested that
the broad, remedial phrasing of the statute was not wholly deliberate but rather the
product of haste and carelessness. Justice Frankfurter observed that: "The dominant conditions of the Reconstruction Period were not conducive to the enactment of carefully
considered and coherent legislation. Strong post-war feelings caused inadequate deliberation
and lead to loose and careless phrasing of laws related to new political issues." United
States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 74 (1951).
13. One source has placed the number of reported cases during the 1875-1939 period
at 19. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on
Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORDER 557, 568.
14. The most critical of these early Supreme Court cases was the Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 'Wall.) 36 (1873), in which a 5-4 majority held that the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities clause protected only rights of national citizenship. Since
the rights of national citizenship were quite limited (the right to travel to the nation's
capital being one), the fourteenth amendment did not reach the type of outrageous conduct
by state officials that inspired the passage of §1983's predecessor. For a comprehensive
review of this early judicial restriction, see Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 Micu. L. Riv. 1323, 1330-37 (1952).
15. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Myers
v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
16. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
17. Id. at 501.

11.
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granting relief, Justice Robert's opinion for the Court affirmatively answered
the "narrow" question of whether plaintiffs' freedom to disseminate information about labor organizations was a "privilege and immunity" protected by
the fourteenth amendment.18 Justice Stone's lengthy concurring opinion, however, engaged in a broader analysis of section 1983, indicating that:
[It] extends broadly to deprivation by state action of the rights, privileges
and immunities secured to persons by the Constitution. It thus includes
the Fourteenth Amendment and such privileges and immunities as
are secured by the due process and equal protection clauses, as well as
by the privileges and immunities clause of that Amendment. 9
Justice Stone's recognition that violation of the due process and equal protection clauses created a cause of action under section 1983 provided the
foundation for the Court's later, more expansive analysis of the remedy. 20
Although neither opinion squarely addressed the issue of whether defendants'
actions were under color of state law, plaintiffs' allegations indicated that
the officials were acting pursuant to city ordinances. 21
Of critical importance to the future expansion of section 1983 was the
interpretation placed on the phrase "under color" by Justice Douglas in the
1945 case of Screws v. United States.2 2 The case arose under section 1983's
criminal counterpart derived from the 1871 legislation, 2 which also contains
the "under color" requirement. The Screws decision involved the issue of
whether a fatal beating administered by a Georgia sheriff to a black arrestee
was performed under color of state law. Although the force applied was
excessive and clearly without authority, the Court concluded that the beating
had nevertheless occurred while the sheriff was performing his duty. Therefore, the conduct came within the statute since "[i]t is clear that under
'color' of law means under 'pretense' of law."'24 By this reasoning, the abuse
of the power granted to an officer by the state was actionable under the
5
statute.
18.

Id.

19. Id. at 526.
20.
21.

See text accompanying notes 45-82 infra.
307 U.S. at 501.

22. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
23. 18 U.S.C. §242 (1974).
24. 325 U.S. at 111. The construction in Screws reaffirmed the earlier construction
announced in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941) (state official charged
with willfully depriving plaintiff of his right to vote and convicted under 18 U.S.C. §242).
25. Justice Frankfurter, in his lengthy Monroe dissent, strongly disagreed with the
pretense construction of "under color" that derived from Screws and Classic. His analysis of
the relevant legislative history persuaded him that Congress had intended to reach
only those illegal actions taken pursuant to state law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 212-16
(1961). He was especially critical of the Court's analysis in Classic, arguing that the construction of the "under color" phrase had been "summarily announced without exposition"
on an issue "only passingly argued." Id. at 217. Furthermore, he felt that the cases relied
on as authority had not clearly presented the issue. Id. at 217-18. Frankfurter argued that
the majority in Screws had uncritically concluded that Classic was stare decisis on the
"under color" issue. Id. at 218. Tbe Monroe majority cited Classic and Screws as justifying
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MONROE V. PAPE

Section 1983 was definitively construed by Justice Douglas 16 years after
Screws in the seminal case of Monroe v. Pape,26 which firmly established a
civil action for damages against state officials for deprivations of civil rights.
The Court's holding, in view of lower court decisions reaching similar conclusions, 27 was not as significant as the Court's expansive analysis of the
scope of section 1983 and its emphasis on federal courts as the primary protectors of civil rights.

28

In holding 13 Chicago policemen liable for an egregious search and seizure
violation,29 Douglas engaged in an extensive analysis of the legislative history
of section 198330 from which he derived the "three main aims" of section
1983: (1) to override certain types of state laws; 31 (2) to provide "a remedy
where state law was inadequate";32 and (3) to provide a federal remedy if
the theoretically adequate state remedy was inadequate in practice. 33 Douglas,
however, went beyond these basic purposes and concluded broadly:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give
relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and
the importation of the pretense formulation from these criminal cases into the civil
action under §1983. Id. at 184-85. See text accompanying notes 37-38 infra.
26. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
27. See, e.g., Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 776 (1947). Picking was later overruled in Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 584 (3d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967). For a discussion of the cases arising during
the period from Screws to Monroe, see Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. P'ape and the
Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 287-94 (1965).
28. "Monroe did much more than sound a note of encouragement for victims of
conduct theretofore only apparently proscribed by the language of section 1983. The point
is not that [the Court] was departing radically from prior interpretations of the provision,
for . . . several of its conclusions were anticipated by lower court opinions. Rather, the
Supreme Court in Monroe exhibited a sweeping change in the judicial attitude toward
the reading of complaints under section 1983." Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871: Continuing
Vitality, 40 NoTRE DAME LAW. 70, 72 (1964).
29. Monroe brought an action for damages against 13 individual police officers and
the City of Chicago as their employer. He alleged that the officers' conduct deprived him
of his constitutional rights within the meaning of §1983. Justice Douglas outlined the facts
in Monroe as follows: "The complaint alleges that 13 Chicago police officers broke into
petitioner's home in the early morning, routed them from bed, made them stand naked
in the living room, and ransacked every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattress
covers. It further alleges that Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained
on open charges for 10 hours, while he was interrogated about a two-day-old murder, that
he was not taken before a magistrate . . . that he was not permitted to call his family
or attorney, that he was subsequently released without criminal charges being preferred
against him. It is alleged that the officers had no search warrant and no arrest
warrant ..
" 365 U.S. at 169.
30. Id. at 171-92. Justice Douglas' analysis of the legislative history was undertaken
in part to refute the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff's remedy was under state,
not federal law, and that the "under color" phrase meant pursuant to state law.
31. Id. at 173.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 174.
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the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one
34
is invoked.
Rejecting the defendant's arguments that the plaintiff's remedy was under
state law, Douglas laid the foundation for the no-exhaustion doctrine of section
1983 that was more fully developed in later cases3s and that has been a focus
for critics of expanded section 1983 jurisdiction.36
In further construing the statute, Douglas relied on Screws 37 and determined
that the "under color" requirement in section 1983 must be given a similar
construction to the analogous criminal statute; therefore, this phrase was
interpreted to mean acting under pretense of state law. 3s Douglas, however,
refused to read into section 1983 the criminal statute's express element of
willfulnesss9 or "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right."4 0
Rather, Douglas concluded that section 1983 "should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions.141 Although finding the individual officers liable,
Douglas concluded that the drafters of section 1983 had not intended
municipalities to be included as "persons" liable under the statute; 42 this
controversial conclusion has precluded access to the "deep pocket" in actions
against police officers.
In sum, the Monroe Court's reliance on the due process clause, the conclusion that section 1983 was supplementary to any state remedy, and the
relaxed scienter element required for an actionable deprivation cumulatively
set an expansive tone for the application of section 198343 and affirmed the
34. Id. at 183.
35. See text accompanying notes 63-74 infra for a discussion of the later development
of the no-exhaustion doctrine.
36.

See, e.g., Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape,

82 HAuv. L. REv. 1486, 1491 (1969); Aldisert, supra note 13, at 563-64.
37. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
38. 365 U.S. at 184-85. Justice Frankfurter strongly dissented from this view of the
"under color" requirement. See note 25 supra.
39. 365 U.S. at 187. The criminal statute is 18 U.S.C. §242 (1974).
40. 365 U.S. at 187, quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945).
41. 365 U.S. at 187. This was clearly not meant to be nor has it been interpreted
as imposing strict liability for constitutional deprivations. "It is more likely that Mr.
Justice Douglas did not intend to alter the state-of-mind requirement for the underlying
tort, but meant rather to eliminate any requirement that a defendant know or have
reason to know that his tort infringes a federal right." The Supreme Court, 1960 Term,
75 HARV. L. Rzv. 40, 215 (1961). See also note 43 infra.
42. 365 U.S. at 187-91. For a persuasive argument that Justice Douglas incorrectly
construed the legislative debates regarding municipal immunity, see Kates & Kouba, Liability
of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. Rev. 131 (1972).
This article contains an excellent discussion of the problems of municipal immunity
under §1983 and the policy factors favoring its abolition. For further discussion of judicial
attempts to alleviate the immunity problem, see notes 112-122 infra and accompanying
text.
i
43. The Monroe Court's constructions of §1983, with the exception of the tort
mental element, had been presaged by Hague and Screws and anticipated in some lower court
decisions. See Shapo, supra note 27, at 287-94; Note, supra note 28, at 72. The Court also
strongly, if implicitly, affirmed the use of the due process clause as a basis for a. §
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primacy of the federal courts as a forum for deprivation of constitutional
4
rights.
POST-Monroe DEVELOPMENT

The expansive analysis of section 1983 in Monroe resulted in a quantum
increase in the number of actions in the next decade.4 5 The suits instituted
covered a broad spectrum of alleged constitutional deprivations and were
facilitated primarily by the broad interpretation given the fourteenth
amendment due process clause and the incorporation of most of the substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. 46 The
present scope of the remedy is suggested by cases alleging deprivations resulting
from fire department hair-length regulations,4 7 from the patronage practices of
the Democratic Party apparatus in Chicago, 4. from a university's withdrawal
of an artist's nude painting from an exhibition on university premises,2
and from the Nevada Gaming and Control Board's blacklist of undesirable
persons.50 Each of these alleged deprivations has been held sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss for failure to state a section 1983 claim. In addition,
section 1983 continues to be a vehicle for the redress of unconstitutional
voting apportionment," racial discrimination in educational opportunities52
and other infringements. 51

1983 action. 365 U.S. at 171. Justice Stone in Hague, see text accompanying notes 19-20
supra, had first stressed the application of the due process clause, and lower courts had
read complaints generously prior to Monroe. See, e.g., Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th
Cir. 1953) (plaintiff clearly attempted to state claim under §1983's predecessor so that
there was a sufficient allegation of the "'under color" requirement to justify reversal
of dismissal).
The Court's interpretation of the requisite mental element was a useful clarification
in view of the divergent lower court analyses prior to Monroe. Some lower courts had
interpreted §1983 and state tort law to be mutually exclusive; others had read into
§1983 the specific intent requirement of the related criminal statute; still others had
extended overly broad immunities to state officials. The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 213 (1961).
44. A defender of expanded §1983 jurisdiction has described its modern scope simply.
"A person may resort to the federal courts to remedy an abuse by a state official in a
matter of personal rights protected by the Federal Constitution." Chevigny, Section 1983
Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1356 (1970).
45. See text accompanying notes 86-90 infra.
46. For a discussion of this development, see Shapo, supra note 27, at 321-24.
47. Michini v. Rizzo, 379 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1974), afJ'd, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d
Cir. 1975).
48. Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 356 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
49. Close v. Lederle, 303 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1969), rev'd, 424 F.2d 988 (Ist Cir.
1970).
50. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962).
51. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
52. See, e.g., McNeese v. Bd. of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
53. See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1968)

(denial of equal protection

to blacks and

Puerto Ricans

in urban renewal

relocation).
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Currently, the bulk of section 1983 claims are asserted against state prison
officials for alleged violations of prisoners' constitutional rights and against
police officers.54 The greatest increase in the number of section 1983 actions
has been in state prisoner complaints. 5 While in some post-Monroe cases
lower federal courts had denied such petitions on the ground that federal
courts should not interfere with the operation of state prisons, 56 the Supreme
Court in 1964 implicitly rejected such a view in Cooper v. Pate.s7 In that decision the Court reversed a lower court's dismissal of a Black Muslim's claim
that he had been unconstitutionally deprived of access to religious literature.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have extended the no-exhaustion doctrine
to suits by prisoners through per curiam reversals of lower court dismissals
on exhaustion grounds.58 The prison context is the clearest example of federal
intrusion into state affairs under section 1983, and critics of expanded section
1983 jurisdiction have focused special attention on the use of the remedy in
this area. 59
Plaintiffs asserting section 1983 claims against police officers have succeeded
in stating actionable due process violations, as well as deprivations under the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment.8 0 For example, a plaintiff who was beaten by the police during
an arrest might assert that the beating deprived him of due process since
54. See Shapo, supra note 27, at 297-309, 320.
55. In 1966 there were 218 §1983 petitions filed by state prisoners; in 1974, the number
was 5,236, a 2,300% increase over 1966. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES CoURTS 220 (1974).
A wide variety of alleged prisoner deprivations have sustained §1983 actions. See
Hines v. Askew, 514 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1975) (discriminatory denial of access to vocational
training); Bailey v. Crain, 496 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1974) (denial of medial treatment and
continuous harassment); Aulds v. Foster, 484 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973) (unjustified beatings
by prison guards); O'Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1973) (refusal to allow
visits by a clergyman); Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963) (denial of access
to the courts).

Although a wide variety of actions are sustained, broad conclusory allegations regarding
prison grievances are generally rejected. See, e.g., Patterson v. Walters, 363 F. Supp. 486
(W.D. Pa. 1973). Other claims have been held insufficient to state the requisite deprivation.
See, e.g., Elam v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973) (claim
asserting prison's failure to provide means in compliance with religious dietary laws); Campbell v. Patterson, 377 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (claims of improper and inadequate
medical treatment).
56. See, e.g., Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964).
57. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam reversal).
58. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968). For a discussion of the no-exhaustion doctrine in §1983 cases, see text accompanying
notes 63-74 infra.
59. See Aldisert, supra note 13, at 575-77.
60. To maintain his cause of action against a policeman or prison official, a §1983
plaintiff must sufficiently allege that the misconduct by the defendant deprived him of
some constitutional right under color of state law. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
The constitutional deprivation must be alleged since the plaintiff cannot plead only that
a state law tort was committed. See Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. IIl. 1974).
While some "semblance of factual specificity" regarding the act committed and the right
infringed is required, Buszka v. Johnson, 351 F. Supp. 771, 773 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the
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punishment was inflicted prior to a jury trial to determine his guilt or
innocence of the offense; 61 alternatively, he might allege that the beating
was cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment as applied
to the states through the fourteenth. 62
The Section 1983 No-Exhaustion Doctrine
The Court's conclusion in Monroe that section 1983 was supplementary
to any available state remedy and that the state remedy "need not be first
sought and refused before the federal one is invoked ' ' 63 laid the broad foundation for subsequent development of section 1983's no-exhaustion doctrine. Two
years after Monroe the Court in McNeese v. Board of Education held that
black plaintiffs seeking equitable relief from school segregation were not
required to exhaust the available state administrative procedure. 64 The Court's
analysis was unclear, but the opinion could be read as sustaining a no-exhaustion rule only if the state remedy was inadequate or provided tenuous
protection for the federal rights asserted.65 The Court's language suggested
a recognition of the traditional inadequate remedy exception to the administrative exhaustion rule.6 6 Furthermore, this reading would comport with
one of the primary purposes of section 1983 - to provide a federal remedy

when the theoretically available state remedy is inadequate. 6
Four years later, however, in Damico v. California, the Court held in a per
curiam opinion that welfare claimants need not exhaust administrative

courts are usually generous in construing §1983 complaints. See Wilkerson v. City of
Coralville, 478 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1973). The courts are particularly solicitous of pro se
litigants. See, e.g., Newsome v. Sielaff, 375 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Most of the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights have sustained §1983 actions
against the police. First amendment: Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962) (seizure
of religious tracts being peaceably distributed); fourth amendment: Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961); Beightol v. Kunowski, 486 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1973) (illegal forcible
detention of plaintiff for fingerprints and mug shots); see also York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450
(9th Cir. 1963) (privacy theory); Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962); fifth amendment: Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971) (failure to comply with Miranda
requirements resulted in coerced confession); sixth amendment: Lewis v. Brautigam, 227
F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1956) (deprivation of right to counsel when police moved plaintiff from
county jail to state prison to prevent consultation with attorney regarding murder defense);
eighth amendment: Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974) (failure to secure
needed medical attention for arrested plaintiff).
61. See Smith v. Spina, 477 F.2d 1140, 1144 n.1 (3d Cir. 1973). In Smith the plaintiff
was denied relief, but in dicta the court discussed the two alternative theories on which
federal jurisdiction under §1983 could be asserted. The case presents a useful discussion
of the confusion between state law tort actions and constitutional claims under §1983.
Id. at 1144-45.
62. The eighth amendment was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 670 (1962).
63. 365 U.S. at 183. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
64. 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963).
65. Id. at 674, 676.
66. See generally L. JAFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 429-58 (1965).
67. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
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remedies prior to initiating a section 1983 action. 6s Monroe and McNeese
were cited as authority, 69 but the opinion did not discuss the adequacy of
the state procedure. The absolute no-exhaustion rule suggested in Damico
was affirmed the following year in Houghton v. Shafer70 In that case plaintiff
prisoner had initially sought resolution of his claim in the prison administrative
procedure but had failed to exhaust administrative appeals prior to initiating
a section 1983 action. The Court, citing Monroe, McNeese, and Damico,
held that exhaustion of the appeals process was not required.72 Significantly,
the Court said that resort to such remedies would amount to a "futile act,"
but added that, on the basis of the three prior cases, resort was unnecessary
7 2

"[i]n any event."

The Court's development of the no-exhaustion doctrine from an
unelaborated statement by Justice Douglas in Monroe to an absolute rule in
Houghton has been strongly criticized. One critic has noted the lack of
synthesis of precedent and articulation of sound bases of decision in this
development."3 Another has characterized the decision in McNeese as "much
4
more in the nature of judicial fiat than a reasoned analysis of the problem."7
This lack of a clear statutory foundation and well-reasoned precedent renders
the no-exhaustion rule the weakest link in an expansive section 1983 analysis.
PropertyRights Under Section 1983
An additional dimension of section 1983 jurisdiction was established by
the Supreme Court in 1972. In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,5 the
Court overturned a distinction between personal and property rights that
had been recognized in earlier decisions76 and that was based on an apparent
68. 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
69. Id. at 417. This decision has been criticized for citing Monroe and McNeese as
"settled" law in the exhaustion area, which extends the application of the two cases without
any discussion of the adequacy of the state remedy. Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies
Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. Rav. 1201, 1209 (1968).
70. 392 U.S. 639 (1968).
71. Id. at 64041.
72. Id. at 640.
73. This commentator referred to the no-exhaustion holding in McNeese as a "questionable expansion of an unsubstantiated, half-concealed statement in a judicial remedies case
[Monroe] into a full-fledged purpose, a strongly stated no-exhaustion rule, and the
rejection for section 1983 matters of any definite distinction between state administrative
and state judicial remedies." Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of

Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1486, 1491 (1969). It is arguable that the no-exhaustion
rule was "strongly stated" in McNeese since the Court did discuss the adequacy of the
state remedy without indicating whether exhaustion would have been required had the
state remedy actually been adequate. However, the above criticism is clearly applicable
a fortiori to the Court's extended development of the doctrine in Damico and Houghton.
74. L DAvis, Am NisTRATrvE LAw TREATISE 20.01, at 646 (Supp. 1970), cited in
Aldisert, supra note 13, at 565.
75. 405 U.S. 538 (1972). The action in Lynch, asserting jurisdiction under §§1343(3)
and (4) was brought against Connecticut sheriffs who had garnished plaintiff's bank
accounts pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional state statute and against the creditors
who had instituted the proceedings. Id. at 539-40.
76. See, e.g., McManigal v. Simon, 382 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
US. 980 (1968).
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conflict between the section 1343(3) and section 1331 jurisdictional statutes."7
The dichotomy that was introduced in Hague v. Council of Industrial
Organizations78 had resulted in some lower courts denying section 1983
jurisdiction over property deprivation claims if the plaintiff could not
establish the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement under section
1331.7 9 Only personal claims were cognizable under section 1343 (3), which
imposes no monetary jurisdictional threshhold. The district court in Lynch
had relied on its circuit's recognition of the Hague dichotomy in dismissing
a class action challenge to Connecticut's garnishment statute under section
1983.
The Supreme Court, after carefully reviewing the history and purpose
of the two jurisdictional statutes, reversed the district court and expressly
rejected the personal-property rights distinction, concluding that the right to

be free from unlawful property deprivations was a personal right.5 0 The
potential impact of Lynch was demonstrated by the subsequent case of Cruz v.
8x
Cardwell.
Relying on

Lynch, the Eighth Circuit reversed

the

district

court's dismissal of a section 1983 action based on a fourteenth amendment
property deprivation - $206 that the defendant sheriff had failed to return
to the plaintiff-arrestee. The result in Cruz, in addition to illustrating the
modern breadth of the remedy, raises the policy question of whether a plaintiff
should be entitled to an immediate federal forum for every property claim
in which the deprivation occurred under the color of state law. The Lynch
fact situation, a class action challenge to a state garnishment statute, is
arguably a federal case - section 1983 was enacted to remedy deprivations
against classes of citizens and to override unconstitutional state laws.82 How77. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1974) confers jurisdiction on federal district courts of civil
actions arising "under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," in which
the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement is sufficiently alleged. 28 U.S.C. §§1343(3)
and (4) (1974) confer jurisdiction of civil rights actions and substantially track the
language of §1983 and related statutes but require no allegation of amount in controversy.
Justice Stone in Hague had felt that to rationalize the coexistence of the two statutes.
§1331 must apply only to property rights, and §1343 only to personal rights. If this
distinction were accepted, a property claim could be litigated under §1983 only if the
plaintiff could assert jurisdiction under §1331, which would require a claim worth
$10,000 or more. Not all of the lower courts recognized the distinction Stone suggested, and
those that did would strain interpretations of the right asserted to avoid dismissing a
meritorious complaint. For an excellent discussion of Hague and Lynch and the intervening lower court cases, see The Supreme Court, 1971 Termn, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 201-07
(1972).
78. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
79. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841
(1970).
80. 405 U.S. at 552. See Aldisert, supra note 74, at 569. Judge Aldisert states that:
"Lynch, unfortunately, has made the federal court a nickel and dime court. A litigant
now has a passport to federal court if he has a 5-dollar property claim and can find some
state action. This result is to be contrasted with a claim against a federal officer for deprivation where the plaintiff must meet the statutory amount in controversy.
Aldisert.
supra note 13, at 569 (emphasis original).
81. 486 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1973).
82. See text accompanying notes 9, 31 supra.
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ever, an individual claim asserting an unlawful conversion of $206 by an
individual state official should be left to state remedies.
MODERN CONCERNS WITH SECTION 1983

JURISDICTION

The expansion of the section 1983 remedy to cover a broad range of
constitutional rights, 3 the further development of the no-exhaustion of state
remedies requirement, 84 and the absence of a monetary jurisdictional threshold
have resulted in a realization of the fears of the opponents of the original
legislation. 85 Present concerns regarding the scope of the remedy have been
expressed in three overlapping areas: (1) the burden imposed on overcrowded
federal court dockets by the proliferation of actions; (2) the broad underlying
issues of federalism raised by such extensive federal review of state official
action; and (3) the confusion regarding the breadth of the remedy, that is,
the limits of the substantive rights protected by the statute.
The IncreasingFederalCaseloadBurden
The federal district courts are facing a mounting number of section
1983 actions. Between the enactment of the statute in 1871 and 1939, only 19
section 1983 cases were reported. s In fiscal 1960, the year prior to Monroe,
only 280 cases were filed.87 By 1970, the number had mushroomed to 3,586,
and the upward trend continued in 1971 with a 30 percent increase to
4,609.8 One estimate placed the number of actions filed in 1973 at approximately 8,000.89 The diversity and complexity of cases impose additional
burdens on federal judicial resources. 90
The Problem of Federalism
Justice Black defined federalism, or federal-state comity, as:
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government
will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways. 91
83. See text accompanying notes 45-81 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 63-74 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
86. Aldisert, supra note 13, at 568.
87. Id.
88. P. BATER, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WCHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 950 n.3 (2d ed. 1973), cited in Aldisert, supra note 13, at 563.
89. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement
of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. REv. 1 (1974).
90. "These [§1983] cases, even in 1969-70, approximated in volume the appeals in
conventional tort, labor and procedural and jurisdictional matters, falling below only
criminal and habeas corpus cases. Raising issues in fields relatively untilled, their claim
on the Court's time and thought was even more substantial than their number." Coffin,
Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK L. Rv. 567, 570 (1971). Judge Coffin is on
the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
91. Younger v. Harris, 401 US. 37, 44 (1971).
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The modern expansion of the section 1983 remedy, however, compels federal
courts to review a wide range of traditional state functions. 92 The controversy
over the scope of section 1983 jurisdiction is fundamentally a debate over
federalism and the division of responsibility between federal and state courts
for the protection of individual civil rights. 93 In discussing the inherent
dilemma of the debate, one federal judge stated:
In approaching the subject of private litigation under [section 1983],
I must own a Faustian conflict. It is hard to conceive a task more
appropriate for federal courts than to protect civil rights guaranteed by
the Constitution against invasion by the states. Yet, we also have state
courts whose judges, like those of the federal courts, must take an oath
to support the Constirution
and were intended to play an important
94
role in carrying it out.

The expansion of section 1983 jurisdiction and the development of the noexhaustion doctrine have resulted in the burden being carried by the federal
courts.
In a 1970 defense of the modern breadth of the section 1983 remedy,
one commentator conceded that the Court "ha[d] not articulated a doctrinal
basis for the present scope of section 1983 jurisdiction"; 95 nevertheless, he
identified the roots of the policy that favors "affording a federal forum
for protecting federal rights. ' ' 96 First, the superiority of federal courts and
judges in applying federal constitutional law was noted. Second, the unitary
nature of the federal court system was viewed as providing more uniform
treatment of constitutional claims than would 50 individual state systems.
Third, the federal courts were seen as satisfying a "basic felt need for a fair
trial of individual claims," as well as eliminating the potential bias inherent
in state court review of state officials' actions. In conclusion the commentator
argued that federal jurisdiction promotes higher standards of protection for
individual right.

9

7

Critics of expanded section 1983 jurisdiction have argued that immediate
recourse to federal courts and the consequent bypass of state judicial and
administrative processes have the undesirable result of shifting responsibility
for decision making in the area of individual rights away from local officials.
In addition, there is the possibility that state officials can evade their decision
92.

Justice Frankfurter voiced concern with the potential of this result in his Monroe

dissent. "[R]espect for principles which this Court has long regarded as critical to the
most effective functioning of our federalism should avoid extension of a statute . . . into
applications which invite conflict with the administration of local policies. Such an extension
makes the extreme limits of federal constitutional power a law to regulate the quotidian

business of every traffic policeman, every registrar of elections, every city inspector or
investigator.
... 365 U.S. at 241-42.
93. See Chevigny, supra note 44, at 1360.
94.

H.

FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:

A

GENERAL VIEW

90 (1973), cited in Aldisert,

supra note 13, at 561.

95.

Chevigny, supra note 44, at 1353.

96. Id. at 1356.
97. Id. at 1356-60.
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making responsibilities by allowing federal courts to make the difficult or
unpopular decisions. 98
The Substantive Rights Protected by Section 1983
The critical underlying factor in the increase of section 1983 actions and
the greater intrusion into areas of state concern has been the increase in
the scope of fourteenth amendment protections. This expansion has occurred
in two ways: first, the rights protected by the due process clause have increased with the closer interrelationship of citizens and state governments;
second, most of the substantive protections of the first 10 amendments have
been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. 99 The protections
guaranteed by those amendments, which were originally conceived as shields
interposed between the federal government and the individual citizen, now
form the basis of civil damage actions against state officials. 100
In addition to this expansion of due process protections, Monroe's conclusion that section 1983 must be "read against the background of tort liability"'10
has added to the analytical confusion regarding the substantive rights protected by section 1983. The problem is to distinguish between a common law
tort committed by a state official and a constitutional deprivation actionable
under section 1983. The Court in Screws noted that not every tort committed
under color of state law is actionable as a constitutional deprivation under
federal law.10 2 Currently, while many state law torts are actionable under
section 1983, some clearly do not have a constitutional dimension.103 The
distinction is, of course, not amenable to a bright-line definition, and judicial
1
attempts at clarification are necessarily ambiguous. 04
A task more difficult than defining the interests currently protected is
deciding which interests should be protected by section 1983 in its modem
application. Critics of expanded section 1983 jurisdiction would construe
the statute in terms of its historical origin and return to the states the initial
task of protecting the majority of the expanded rights now covered by section 1983.105 This viewpoint necessarily favors a reevaluation of the no98. See Aldisert, supra note 13, at 562. This was also the view of Justice Frankfurter
in his Monroe dissent. 365 U.S. at 243.
99. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to
counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment).
100. For a more comprehensive discussion of the development, see Shapo, supra note
27, at 322-24.
101. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra. The Court was attempting to identify
the requisite mental element for §1983 liability after having rejected the "specific intent"
standard of the criminal statute. See note 41 supra.
102. The plurality opinion in Screws stated that: "[The 1871 Congress did not intend]
to make all torts of state officials federal crimes. It brought within [18 U.S.C. §242] only
specified acts done 'under color' of law and then only those acts which deprived a person
of some right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 325 U.S. at 109.
103. For example, an illegal search and seizure may be actionable under state law
as an invasion of privacy, or an unconstitutional arrest as false imprisonment. See text
accompanying notes 158-184 infra.
104. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
105. See, e.g., supranote 36, at 1495-97.
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exhaustion doctrine. 10 6 Defenders of expanded section 1983 jurisdiction
emphasize that the statute must remain responsive to newly felt needs in
the protection of individual civil rights and view the no-exhaustion doctrine
as a necessary element in assuring immediate federal court protection of
10 7
federal rights.
An interesting viewpoint to add to this modern debate is that of Professor
Chafee, a staunch defender of civil rights, who two years before Monroe wrote:
If federal protection be desirable we ought to get it by something
better than a criminal statute of antiquated uncertainties and based
upon the out-moded Privileges and Immunities Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. . . . It is very queer to try to protect human rights in
the middle of the Twentieth Century by a left-over from the days of
General Grant.108
Section 1983 has remained substantially intact for over 100 years. During
the past 15 years the Court has read its broad language to create a pervasive
federal remedy for the protection of human rights. Justice Frankfurter foresaw
the possibility of this post-Monroe development and the formulation of what
he called "policy through legislation."109 If in fact the breadth of the statute
permitted the Warren Court to implement its own civil rights policy, the
statute will not prevent a more restrictive policy analysis by the present
Burger Court. The only constraints will be the limits of the Burger Court's
civil rights policy and the extent to which the Court feels bound by stare
decisis.
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ANALYSIS

One year after the liberalizing 1972 Lynch decision,110 the Court announced
that signaled the beginning of a retreat from expansive
three decisions'
section 1983 analysis.
The MunicipalImmunity Cases
The first two Supreme Court cases resolved issues that were thought to
have been cemented by the Monroe Court's holding that municipalities were
not "persons" liable under section 1983.112 This restrictive holding had reduced
the utility of the remedy in damage actions against municipal officials,
particularly policemen, who were usually judgment proof. Recognizing the
restrictiveness of this interpretation, Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit in
106. See text accompanying notes 63-74 supra.
107. See generally Chevigny, supra note 44, at 1352.
108. Chafee, Safeguarding Fundamental Human Rights: The Tasks of the States and
Nation, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 519, 529 (1959). This view, of course, predated the significant
post-Monroe expansion of the statute's scope.
109. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 244 (1961).
110. See text accompanying notes 75-82 supra.
111. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693 (1973); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
112. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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Carter v. Carlson"3 held that a municipality could be liable under section
1983 if the state's tort law imposed liability. 1 4 Although this expansion of
the remedy was welcomed by commentators,"15 it was rejected by other circuits."" In Moor v. County of Alameda," 7 the Supreme Court decisively rejected the Carlson rationale. Relying on Monroe's construction," s the Court
refused to re-examine that holding in light of the policy arguments for a
more liberal construction."x9
Another more fully developed line of post-Monroe circuit court cases
had conceded municipal immunity in damage actions but had granted injunctive relief against municipalities.120 In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, the Court
struck down this development, holding that nothing in the legislative history
of section 1983 would sustain either damages or injunctive relief against
21
municipalities.'
The Moor and Kenosha decisions, although justified in terms of stare
decisis, restricted potentially useful expansions of the section 1983 remedy
that attempted to deal with the modern realities of actions against municipal
22
officials.
Preiserv. Rodriguez
The third 1973 Supreme Court decision revealed a change in the majority's
thinking on section 1983 and federalism. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the Court,
113. 477 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia
v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
114. 447 F.2d at 369. This interpretation of Monroe simply ignored the holding
of that case that a municipality was not a person under §1983.
115. See, e.g., Comment, 24 VAND. L. RFv. 1252 (1971).
116. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Doe, 476 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1973); Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d
59 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 908 (1973).
117. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
118. Id. at 700. The petitioners did not directly challenge Monroe's holding on
municipal immunity; rather, they sought to circumvent that holding by relying on 42
U.S.C. §1988, which permits federal courts to apply state remedies in civil rights actions
if the available federal remedy is "deficient" or "not adapted to the object." The adopted
state remedy, however, must not be "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." Petitioner argued that since §1983 did not provide a remedy against
municipalities, the federal court could adopt the state's rule of municipal tort liability
through §1988 and apply the state remedy in granting relief under §1983. This argument
was rejected as being inconsistent with Monroe's express holding on municipal immunity;
therefore, §1988 had no application.
119. 411 U.S. at 700 n.10.
120. See, e.g., Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Adams v. City
of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
121. 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973).
122. During the 1976 term, the Burger majority in Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413
(1976), further insulated municipalities from damage actions in federal courts. Answering
a question left open in Moor v. County of Alameda, the Court held 5-4 that district courts
have no authority under pendent jurisdiction principles to join on a pendent state law
claim a party over whom no independent federal jurisdiction exists. This decision prevents
plaintiffs from litigating their state law tort claim against municipalities in federal court
with their §1983 action against the individual officers. For a discussion of the problems
generated by municipal immunity under §1983, see Kates & Kouba, supra note 42, at 131.
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in a 6-3 decision, held that a state prisoner challenging the duration of his
confinement on due process grounds, as opposed to the constitutionality of
the conditions of confinement, must proceed in federal court under the habeas
corpus statute rather than under section 1983.123 Under the habeas corpus
remedy, the state prisoner must exhaust state remedies, a burden not faced
under section 1983.124 The Court emphasized that although the prisoner's
claims were within the literal terms of section 1983, the claims lay at "the
core" of the habeas corpus remedy, and that was their sole remedy. 1 25 In

reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the importance of state primacy in
administration of state prisons and the superiority of state administrative
bodies and courts in resolving the myriad problems for which prisoners
might seek relief. 12 6 Although the holding of the case is quite narrow, the
Court's federalism discussion represented a departure from unquestioned
federal supremacy in protecting constitutional rights and "an admission that
federalism and comity cannot continue to be ignored in section 1983 actions."127
CURRENT RETRENCHMENT IN SECTION

1983

ANALYSIS

The Court's previous foreshadowing of a more restrictive section 1983
analysis developed into a clear signal with two decisions 128 in the 1975-1976
term. The tone of the language and the analyses employed by Justice Rehnquist
are significant indications of the Court's reorientation. Just as Monroe 15 years
earlier set a liberal tone for expansion of the section 1983 remedy, 1 29 these
recent decisions mark the beginning of a more restrictive analysis in the
federal courts.
Rizzo v. Goode
The note sounded by the Supreme Court in Rizzo v. Goode30 is one of
123. 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). The prisoners in Preiser were New York inmates
participating in the state's "good time" credit program; prison officials had reduced their
accumulated credits as a result of prison disciplinary proceedings. Their §1983 actions,
which were joined with the habeas corpus petitions, alleged due process deprivations resulting
from the summary withdrawal of their credits. The §1983 claims were added to avoid
the exhaustion requirement of habeas corpus. The district court granted relief under
§1983 and restored the credits, which resulted in the prisoners being released on parole.
Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627
rehearing en banc, sustained the district court's
406 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972). The court relied on
in which the Supreme Court had appeared
prisoner cases.

(N.D.N.Y. 1969). The Second Circuit, on
application of §1983. Rodriguez v. McGinnis,
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971),
to establish a broad no-exhaustion rule in

124. See text accompanying notes 63-74 supra.
125. 411 U.S. at 489.
126. "It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest,
or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than
the administration of its prisons." Id. at 491-92.
127. Aldisert, supra note 13, at 581.
128. Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
129. See text accompanying notes 43-14.
130.

96 S. Ct. 598 (1976).
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federalism and a consequent diminution of federal court equity power under
section 1983. The case involved class actions brought by two black groups
against the Mayor and Police Commissioner of Philadelphia that sought to
enjoin an alleged pervasive pattern of unconstitutional treatment of black
citizens in the city.131 The mistreatment was allegedly attributable to two
individual police officers not named as defendants; the named defendants
were charged in their supervisory capacities with authorizing or encouraging
the illegal conduct.132 After a lengthy hearing, the district court determined
that the named defendants had not maintained a deliberate policy of violating
constitutional rights; 1 33 however, the court did identify departmental practices
that had the effect of minimizing complaints of police misconduct. Although
the district court felt that its equitable power to supervise the functioning
of the police department was dearly established, it declined to use that
power.134 Rather, the final judgment, based on an agreement negotiated by
the black groups and the police, required the defendants to institute a comprehensive program for dealing adequately with citizen complaints.1 35
In reversing the lower court, Justice Rehnquist for a 5-3 majority indicated
that it was doubtful whether the class representatives had sufficient standing. 15
He nevertheless addressed the district court's "novel" theory that a class
action was sustainable because twenty separate incidents of the constitutional
deprivation of individual rights throughout the entire city were proven. 37
Distinguishing earlier pattern deprivation cases relied on by the lower courts,
131. The case in the district court was tried as parallel trials of separate class actions.
COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In the first, Goode v. Rizzo, plaintiff
class alleged eight separate incidents of unconstitutional conduct by two identified police
officers who were not named as defendants. The district court found unconstitutional
misconduct in three of the eight incidents. In the second action, COPPAR v. Rizzo, 28
separate incidents of misconduct were alleged without specifically identifying any individual
officers. The Supreme Court found the district court's findings on these 28 incidents
unclear but accepted arguendo respondents' contention that 16 of the incidents amounted
to constitutional deprivations. 96 S. Ct. at 602-03.
132. Id. at 602.
133. With regard to the plaintiff class composed of all Philadelphia citizens, the district
court concluded that only a small percentage of police officers had violated their civil
rights. The court felt, however, that the frequency was such that the incidents could not
"be dismissed as rare, isolated instances." COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1319 (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
134. The district court judge stated that: "In the course of these proceedings, much
of the argument has been directed toward the proposition that courts should not attempt
to supervise the functioning of the police department. Although . . . the Court's legal
power to do just that is firmly established . . . I am not persuaded that any -such drastic
remedy is called for, at least initially, in the present cases." Id. at 1320.
135. The plan included the revision of police manuals and rules of procedure for
dealing face-to-face with citizens, improved complaint processing, and notification to citizens
of action taken on their complaints. While finding that the plaintiffs had no constitutional
right to the improvements, the district court judge concluded that the new program was
necessary to prevent future abuses by the police, which were occurring in unacceptably
high numbers. Id. at 1321.
136. 96 S. Ct. at 604-05." The Court felt that the individual respondents' allegations
of potential future injury by unnamed defendants were speculative and conjectural.
137. Id. at 605.
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the Court found that the requisite "pervasive pattern" of deliberate intimida138
tion was not present in this case.
The Court next considered plaintiffs' theory that the Mayor and Police
Commissioner had a duty to eliminate police misconduct, a duty that created
a corresponding right in the citizens to be free from such abuse and that
rendered the defendants liable for its breach under section 1983.139 Rejecting
the existence of such a right as an "amorphous" proposition, the Court concluded that the Mayor and Police Commissioner could not be held vicariously
liable because they had "played no affirmative part" in the individual constitutional violations.

40

Although dicta, the significant part of the Court's discussion addressed
the scope of federal courts' equity powers vis-i-vis "important considerations
of federalism."
Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked,
federal courts must be constantly mindful of the "special delicacy" of the
adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State
administration of its own law.'
Noting that the Court had consistently held the federal government to have
the widest latitude in the administration of its own affairs, the Court
continued its federalism theme.
When the frame of reference moves from a unitary court system
to a system of federal courts representing the Nation, subsisting side
by side with 50 state judicial, legislative, and executive branches, apin
propriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism
' determining the availability and scope of equitable relief. 2
in developing its federalism argument, the majority relied chiefly on recent
cases that stressed the dangers of federal court interference in ongoing state
criminal trials. 4" The majority conceded that principles of federalism are
entitled to the greatest weight in criminal cases but argued that the
principles had never been limited to those situations.'"
138. "'he focus in [Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)] and [Xllee v. Medrano. 416
U.S. 802 (1974)] was not simply on the number of violations which occurred but on the

common thread running through them: a 'pervasive pattern of intimidation' flowing from
a deliberate plan by named defendants to crush the nascent labor organizations." Id. at

606 (emphasis original).
139. Id.
140. Respondents relied primarily on Swann v. Charlone-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ..
402 U.S. 1 (1971) to invoke the broad equitable power of the district court against the
supervisory officials. The Court, however, distinguished the two cases on the basis of the
direct personal involvement of the state officials in Swan and the vicarious involvement
by the officials in the instant case. Id. at 606-07.
141.

Id. at 607, citing Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).

142. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
143.

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592

(1975);

O'Shea v. I.ittleton, 414

U.S.

488 (1974).
144. 96 S. Ct. at 608.
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While the Court could properly have been concerned with the district
court's pronouncement as to its extensive equity powers' 45 the actual intrusion
into the functioning of the police department was minimal in the instant
case and presented an apparently workable solution. 146 Clearly, the majority
in looking beyond the instant case was concerned with "abstract principle that,
when extended to the limits of logic, may produce untoward results .... ,,147
The type of circumstance contemplated by the majority is illustrated by
4s
In that decision inmates of a
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt.1
Boston jail sued the Massachusetts Director of Corrections under section
1983, alleging that the overcrowded jail conditions violated their rights to
due process. The district court granted relief, ordering the defendants not to
incarcerate more than one inmate per cell. 4 9 This plan required a reduction
in jail population and consequently necessitated inmate transfers to other
institutions. When the Commissioner failed to cooperate with the local jail
officials in effecting the transfers, the district court judge calculated the jail's
capacity under his original order, determined the existence of vacancies elsewhere, and issued a more detailed order regarding the transfers to be made. 50
On the Commissioner's appeal, the First Circuit upheld the order, citing
Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education'51 as authority for the
52
exercise of broad equitable power by the district court.'
53
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,'
but the Court's rationale in Rizzo raises doubt as to whether such equitable
intervention by a federal court would now be sustained. In Rizzo the Court
distinguished Swann on the issue of defendents' culpability; the defendants
in Swann were found liable because they had played an affirmative part in the
constitutional deprivations.154 The Court might now conclude that the Commissioner in Inmates of Suffolk County Jail was more like the police commissioner in Rizzo due to his nonaffirmative conduct. Additionally, although
the First Circuit said that the district court would "continue to respect the
expertise of the Commissioner and the practical difficulties he may face,"'155 it

145. See note 137 supra.
146. Prior to taking their appeal from the district court's order, the petitioners had
negotiated and consented to the program eventually ordered. The order was supported

by several amici in the Supreme Court, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and
the Philadelphia Bar Association. 96 S.Ct. at 609 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 477 (1974).
149. The district court found that "the quality of incarceration at (the jail] is 'punishment' of such a nature and degree that it cannot be justified by the state's interest in
holding defendants for trial; and therefore it violates the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment." Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676,
686 (D. Mass. 1973).

150. 494 F.2d at 1198.
151. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

152. 494 F.2d at 1198.
153. 419 U.S. 477 (1974).

154. 96 S.Ct. at 607.
155. 494 F.2d at 1199.
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is unlikely that this represents the degree of deference to the "principles of
federalism" that Rizzo contemplates.
The actual result in Rizzo, the denial of the minimal relief granted by
the district court against official "indifference" 156 to police misconduct, is
regrettable. In dissent Justice Blackmun noted the majority's departure from
the Monroe Court's emphasis on the purpose of section 1983-to "afford a
federal right in federal courts" in order to redress constitutional deprivations
resulting from the neglect of state officials. 157 Rizzo accomplished this departure
by closely reading the factual allegations and strictly requiring affirmative
conduct by state officials. Also, the power of federal courts as forums to
redress deprivations of individual rights was expressly deemphasized.
The positive effect of the decision's federalism discussion, however, is to
introduce greater consideration of state interests in the application of the
section 1983 remedy. The contrast of the rather minimal intrusion involved
in Rizzo with the strong statements of federalism is a clear indication of
the Burger Court's intent to restore some balance in federal court actions
against state officials.
Paulv. Davis
In contrast to Rizzo, in which a class sought equitable relief from alleged
police misconduct, Paul v. Davis involved an individual's action for damages
against police officers for a single alleged wrong.158 The Supreme Court's
primary focus shifted from federalism to an explication of the substantive
fourteenth amendment right protected by section 1983. By clarifying the
scope of the due process clause, the Court attempted to reallocate the burden
of actions against state officials between state and federal forums.
In Paul the police officers had included plaintiff's photograph in a flyer
that identified active shoplifters and that was distributed to approximately
800 merchants. The prior shoplifting charge against the plaintiff had been
dismissed. 159 As a result, plaintiff brought a section 1983 action seeking
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Holding that no constitutionally
protected right of the plaintiff had been infringed, the district court dismissed
the action.160 The Sixth Circuit, relying on the 1971 Supreme Court case of
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,(1 reversed and held that the plaintiff had stated
1 62
a claim for the denial of due process.

On review the Supreme Court reversed in another 5-3 decision. 1 3 The
majority, again through Justice Rehnquist, first addressed the relationship
of the fourteenth amendment due process clause and section 1983 actions
156. 96 S. Ct. at 609 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
157. Id. at 610-11. (Blackmun, J., dissenting, quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,

180 (1961)).
158. 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
159.

Id. at 1158.

160. Id.
161.

400 U.S. 433 (1971).

162. Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1182 (6th Cir. 1974).
163. Id. at 1167.
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to state tort law. 61 The plaintiff, noted the majority, was attempting to convert a "classical" state defamation action into a constitutional case via the
due process clause. 165 Characterizing plaintiff's theory as "strained," the
majority noted that if it were accepted there would be "no logical stopping
place to such reasoning."
Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily to result
in every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by
a state official acting "under color of law" establishing a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. We think it would come as a great
surprise to those who drafted and shepherded the adoption of that
Amendment to learn that it worked such a result .... 16.
Contrary to the developed trend in post-Monroe decisions in which the
lower courts had generously read complaints and permitted broad due
process allegations to sustain section 1983 jurisdiction, 167 the Court read its
prior decisions as indicating the "limited effect of the Fourteenth Amendment." ' Furthermore, the Paul Court believed that the Monroe decision
had emphasized this point.
[In Monroe] the Court was careful to point out that the complaint
stated a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment because it
alleged an unreasonable search and seizure violative of the guarantee
"contained in the Fourteenth Amendment [and] made applicable to
the states by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 6 9
The Court indicated that the plaintiff had not identified the deprivation of a
"specific constitutional guarantee."170 In addition, the Court stated that the
due process clause did not "ex proprio vigore" render all torts committed under
color of state law actionable as constitutional deprivations.1 7 '
Although the lower courts have recognized a distinction between a common
law tort actionable in state court and a constitutional tort triable in federal
court under section 1983, state tort claims styled to allege colorable due

164. Id. at 1158.
165. Id. at 1159. "[Plaintiff] asserted not a claim for defamation under the laws of
Kentucky, but a claim that he had been deprived of rights secured to him by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Concededly if the same allegations had been made about respondent by a private individual, he would have nothing
more than a claim for defamation under state law. But, he contends, since petitioners
are respectively an official of city and of county government, his action is thereby transmuted into one for deprivation by the State of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
166. Id.
167. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
168. 96 S. Ct. at 1160 (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. "[S]uch a reading would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort
law to be superimposed on whatever systems may already be administered by the States." Id.
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process deprivations have been sustained by lower federal courts. For example,
the Third Circuit pointed out:
The two rights of action do not always stand in pari materia. Some
common law and statutory torts . . . do not rise to constitutional
dimensions. The converse is equally true. Conduct may be actionable
as a deprivation of constitutional rights when no force or violence has
been utilized, and there exists no orthodox counterpart of state common
law or statutory relief available7lHowever, in a subsequent case the same court was confronted with a claim
of excessive force used in making an arrest.17 3 Reconstructing the plaintiff's

confusing section 1983 allegations, the court indicated that a fourteenth
amendment due process violation could be made out if the plaintiff alleged
that "without due process of law the police punished him for his alleged
traffic violation by administering a physical beating upon him instead of
submitting him to trial by jury to determine his guilt or innocence....' "..

In this manner, local assault and battery actions against police officers were
brought in federal court. under the amorphous rubric of a due process
violation.175

The Supreme Court in Paul, however, held that only the specific substantive guarantees of the bill of rights that have been incorporated into
the fourteenth amendment - the recognized liberty and property interests
protected by the due process clause - and the substantive, fundamental limitations on government action implicit in the liberty concept of the fourteenth
amendment can form the basis of a section 1983 action.76 As the Court
emphasized, the procedural guarantees of the due process clause "cannot
be the source [of a] body of general federal tort law.' 1 7 Liberty and property
interests protected by procedural due process "attain this constitutional status
by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized and protected
by state law.' ' 1 7 Therefore, in the instant decision, the plaintiff was left
to pursue vindication of his reputation in a state tort action.

172. Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1972).
173. Smith v. Spina, 477 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1973).
174. Id.at 1144 n.1.
175. See, e.g., Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
995 (1974) (due process deprivation held stated against prison personnel who failed to
restrain and disarm another inmate who in their presence attacked plaintiff).
176.

96 S. Ct. at 1160,

1165-66,

1165 n.5.

177. Id.at 1160.
178. Id. at 1165. The Court's references to rights protected by state law is confusing
since it implies that the state is not protecting the plaintiff's interest by making available
a state court for litigation of a tort action. The Court's focus, however, is on the creation
of a legal status by the state. "In each of these cases [holding procedural guarantees of
the due process clause applicable], a right or status previously recognized by state law was

distinctly altered or extinguished. It was this alteration, officially removing the interest
from the recognition and protection previously afforded by the State, which we found
sufficient to invoke the procedural guarantees contained in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074
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The Court also analyzed and rejected an alternate theory of section 1983
jurisdiction -that the plaintiff's reputational interest alone was protected as
a fourteenth amendment liberty interest. 179 Conceding that prior decisions
had identified the drastic effect of the stigma attached by government defamation, the Court concluded that an injury to reputation alone, "apart from
some more tangible interest such as employment," is insufficient to invoke
the protections of the due process clause.18 0
The vigorous dissent attacked the majority's emphasis on the availability
of a state tort action that duplicated the plaintiff's section 1983 allegations."s
Given the fact that the policemen's conduct was intentional and clearly under
color of law, the dissent argued that the only issue properly presented was
whether plaintiff's reputation was a recognized liberty interest under the
fourteenth amendment, an issue the dissent would have resolved affirmatively.18 2
Additionally, while not specifically addressing the majority's rejection of the
due process clause as a "font of tort law," the dissent rejected the restrictive
interpretations placed on fourteenth amendment liberty and property interests.
The dissent also discarded the majority's apparent conclusion that such
interests are protected only when recognized by state law or protected by
3
one of the guarantees incorporated into the Bill of Rights.
The majority's interpretation, restricting the previously understood scope
of liberty interests, is an unfortunate reversal in the protection of an individual's reputation. Nevertheless, the Court's construction of the operative
effect of the due process clause will significantly affect future application of
section 1983. Although the Court was defining the reach of the constitutional
guarantee, the effect was to narrow the class of alleged constitutional deprivations that will sustain section 1983 jurisdiction. Monroe's elevation of the due
process clause as a source of section 1983 jurisdiction, the liberal reading of
plaintiffs' alleged constitutional deprivations, and the broad remedial tone
of the decision had resulted in more amorphous due process allegations
(1976), in which the Court, construing the applicable state law as not creating any pro-

tected property interest, upheld the discharge of a policeman who did not receive a
hearing.
179.

Id. at 1160-66.

180. Id. at 1161. The plaintiff was not a state employee and did not lose his job as
a result of the flyer. However, his employer did warn him about future recurrences. Id.
The case of Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), which the Court of
Appeals had held controlling, was distinguished from the instant case in that the stigma

involved in Constantineau-posting of plaintiff's name in taverns pursuant to a state law
prohibiting liquor sales to those posted-was accompanied by the loss of a legal status,
the right to buy alcoholic beverages. In the instant case, the majority pointed out that

state law did not extend to the plaintiff "any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of
reputation" that was infringed by the defendants' actions. 96 S. Ct. at 1166. The dissent

persuasively argued that the concept of a reputational interest in liberty had never been
so restrictively defined and that the majority's decision rendered "due process concerns
never applicable to the official stigmatization, however arbitrary, of an individual." Id. at
1170 (emphasis original). The dissent found this prospect "frightening for a free people."
Id. (Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).

181. Id. at 1167-68.
182. Id. at 1168.
183. Id. at 1171 n.10.
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sustaining jurisdiction. Paul, however, restricts Monroe to its facts- a deprivation of a specific incorporated guarantee -and thus significantly limits the
remedial effect of section 1983.
Although the Court required an alleged violation of a specific constitutional
guarantee, it failed to establish a standard for future courts to apply to judge
the sufficiency of a section 1983 complaint. Prior to Paul, a plaintiff assaulted
by police might have invoked section 1983 jurisdiction on the basis of a
due process violation. 18 4 Now, in the aftermath of Paul, he might restate the
identical factual allegations but select the eighth amendment's cruel and
unusual punishment clause as his constitutional deprivation. It is difficult
to ascertain whether the district court would grant section 1983 jurisdiction
or find that the plaintiff was merely attempting to invoke federal jurisdiction
for his state law tort claim. While the literal language of Paul would seem
to sustain jurisdiction, the Court's obvious intent to require classical state
tort actions to be litigated in state courts may require a convincing rather
than a colorable allegation of a specific violation. An example of the former
would be the clear fourth amendment violation in Monroe. Thus, the federal
district courts must more carefully confront the ambiguous issue of whether
a state law tort has risen to a constitutional dimension.
The Court's emphasis on the difference between common law torts and
constitutional deprivations should have the positive effect of reducing expanded section 1983 jurisdiction. The broad remedial emphasis of the Monroe
decision resulted in lower courts giving more liberal readings to section 1983
complaints. After Paul a section 1983 claim asserting tortious injury by state
officials should be read more strictly to find a clear constitutional deprivation
and a firm basis for federal intervention.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In Rizzo and Paul the Court made an important beginning in redefining the

proper scope of section 1983 jurisdiction. The doctrinal underpinning of
previous expansive analysis - the emphasis on the immediate availability of
a federal forum to enforce every constitutional right - has been clearly rejected
by the Burger Court. The recent emphasis on reducing the intervention of
federal courts in areas of state concern and on increasing the involvement of
state courts in the protection of individual rights provides a sound doctrinal
base for future applications of section 1983. In addition, the explication of
the fourteenth amendment's scope in Paul adds some clarification of the substantive rights protected by section 1983. But Rizzo and Paul are still
beginnings and the full contours of this rationale must be developed in future
cases. The manner in which district courts are to properly restrain their
equitable powers in response to the Supreme Court's federalism emphasis
and a clearer distinction between a classical state law tort and a constitutional
deprivation cognizable under section 1983 must be elaborated.
The critical question remaining is whether the Court will merely superin184. Cf. Smith v. Spina, 477 F.2d 1140
173 supra.

(3d Cir. 1973). See text accompanying note
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tend the implementation of its new analysis by lower courts or will reverse
existing section 1983 precedent to further restrict section 1983 jurisdiction.
Since the Monroe decision, critics of expanded section 1983 jurisdiction have
developed theories explaining the proper functional role of the remedy in
modern society. Prior to considering what the Court may or should do, it
will be useful to briefly review some of these suggested approaches.
Proposalsfor the Modern Scope of Section 1983 Jurisdiction
Critical analyses of expanded section 1983 jurisdiction generally accept
the three original purposes of section 1983 identified in Monroe: to override
state statutes conflicting with federal law, to provide a remedy for violation
of a federal right when the state remedy is inadequate, and to provide a federal
remedy when the state's theoretically adequate remedy is unavailable in
practice1 8 5 Instead the proposals focus on the necessity of restricting the
remedy to conform more closely to its historical origins and restricting or
eliminating the no-exhaustion doctrine.
An early post-Monroe proposal suggested a two-tiered functional analysis
for section 1983 jurisdiction derived from the historical origins of the statute. 8 6
The first element of this analysis requires that the defendant's conduct in depriving the plaintiff of his rights be outrageous, reprehensible, or shocking;
in the police tort cases extraordinarily offensive conduct is needed.'8 r In cases
that lack the element of physical coercion, the plaintiff must allege facts
showing a near-total breakdown in local law enforcement."' While this approach reflects in part the original legislative purpose, it is dearly too restrictive for modem conditions. Constitutional deprivations can be committed
without violence or other shocking conduct.18 9 The solution to restricting section 1983 jurisdiction is not to give it an 1871 interpretation but to attempt
to mold it to fill modern needs.
A more recent proposal is directed at overriding the no-exhaustion doctrine
and Monroe's supplementary remedy rationale in section 1983 cases.'5 0 Unless
one of the three situations in Monroe were present, or the deprivation were
alleged by a class or some member thereof, this proposal would require
federal courts to defer to state courts if adequate remedies existed.' 9' Going
beyond the elimination of the no-exhaustion doctrine, this deferral approach
would not permit de novo federal jurisdiction once state remedies have been
exhausted but would limit plaintiffs to the normal appellate processes. 92 The
185. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
186. Shapo, supra note 27, at 327-29.
187. Id. at 327-28.
188. Id. at 328. The two-tiered approach would not be applied to cases involving
first amendment rights since they have been traditionally subject to "zealous judicial
protection." Id. at 329.
189. See Note, supra note 36, at 1508.
190. Id. at 1486.
191. Id. at 1502. "The cases subject to dismissal from federal courts under the deferral
approach would be those of individual deprivations when state remedies are adequate in
theory and practice and no state law is challenged as denying a federally secured right."
192. ld. at 1502-04. The author details the appellate procedures that the deferral

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss4/2

26

Dewberry: Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVii

primary criticism of this proposal is that it imposes onerous burdens on
section 1983 plaintiffs to demonstrate inadequacy or unavailability of state
remedies. Also, the district. courts would be compelled to engage in a difficult
weighing of subtle factors to decide whether to defer. 19 Although concern
with expanded section 1983 jurisdiction is proper, the role of federal courts
in protecting federal rights need not be diminished to the extent contemplated
by the deferral approach. A better balance between state and federal interests
must be found.
A federal appeals court judge has suggested that section 1983 jurisdiction
194
The statute that he proposes would remove from
be restricted by statute.
section 1983 jurisdiction those cases in which state interests predominate, in
which state remedies are adequate in fact, in which no "specially important"
federal rights are threatened, or in which no irreparable harm would result
from declining federal jurisdiction. 19s While fully articulating the policies of
federalism that a legislator might consider in amending section 1983, the
proposal requires broad standards that cannot be expressly incorporated into
a concrete substantive or jurisdictional statute. In contrast to the "deferral"
approach, this proposal focuses attention on the quality of the deprivation
as well as the adequacy of state remedies.
All of these functional approaches to section 1983 jurisdiction, if enacted
into statute or implemented by the Court, would eliminate classes of cases
that arguably should not be in federal court - minor property claims, torts
with only colorable constitutional overtones, prison grievances, and cases such
as challenges to hair-length regulations. But as one critic of such functional
approaches has noted, they reflect "an excessive confidence in the effectiveness
of flexible procedural standards in isolating and protecting the truly 'deserving*
cases." 196 Moreover, each has its own inherent problems. Although the modern
scope of section 1983 has been solely a judicial creation, a sudden change in
section 1983 jurisdiction through adoption of similar functional tests by the
Court would be more of a legislative than a judicial act.
If the Court cannot legislate a new scope of section 1983 jurisdiction
through sweeping departures from prior analysis, the proper role of the
Court in further clarifying section 1983 jurisdiction should be identified.

approach would entail. He states a preference for the deferral approach over the imposition
of an exhaustion requirement since under the latter "once the plaintiff has pursued his
state remedies lie may return to federal court and demand full relitigation as to fact and
law on whatever federal claims lie still has." Id. at 1502. The result of this would he a
lower reduction of the burden on the federal courts than under the deferral approach.
and "much of the reduction would come about through the imposition of expense and
delay too great for many plaintifts to bear." Id.
193. See Clievigny, supra note 44, at 1356 (the author criticizes the entire deferral
approach and its underlying federalism rationale, as well as advancing strong arguments
for the continued existence of expansive §1983 jurisdiction).
194. Aldisert, supra note 13, at 577-78.
195. Id.at 577. Judge Aldisert would distinguish cases affecting the "rights of black
citizens to equal education, housing, or employment opportunity- questions which should
be handled by the federal courts." Id. at 578.
196. See Chevigny, supra note 44, at 1356.
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First, the Court should continue to articulate and implement considerations
of federalism in applying section 1983 in the area of equitable intervention
in state affairs by district courts. Second, the nature of the substantive right
protected, particularly a clearer distinction between a common law tort and
constitutional deprivation, must continue to be defined. These are the
approaches begun in Rizzo and Paul and both should have positive impacts
on lower court handling of section 1983 complaints. Further diminution of
section 1983 jurisdiction would require the Court to overrule or substantially
modify existing precedent.
In considering possible reversals or modification of current section 1983
doctrine, the modern construction of the statute seems solid. Although
Justice Douglas' construction of "under color" was initially questioned, 197 the
statute would have a virtually nonexistent scope without the pretense formulation of Screws-Monroe. The mental element or tort standard of liability also
seems sound in policy. The Court has adhered to the Monroe holding as to
municipal immunity9 8 and has recently indicated an adherence to traditional
section 1983 official immunity analysis. 99 However, one key area of expansive
section 1983 analysis clearly merits re-examination by the Court.
The Future of the No-Exhaustion Doctrine
The critical area of section 1983 precedent subject to reversal or modification by the Burger Court is the no-exhaustion doctrine. The potential for
this result derives from the Court's present emphasis on federalism, 200 the
recognition of state courts in the scheme of protecting individual rights, 201
197. See note 25 supra.
198. See text accompanying notes 112-122 supra.
199. In the recent case of Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976), the Court extended
an absolute immunity under §1983 to state prosecutors engaged in their prosecutorial function. The Court followed the traditional approach originally adopted in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), in which the Court held that official tort immunities under the
common law had not been abrogated by §1983. Therefore, in deciding whether to extend
a common law immunity to §1983, the Court first considers what immunity existed at
common law and then determines if the policy supporting the immunity will also justify
its extension to §1983.
200. For a discussion of Rizzo v. Goode, see text accompanying notes 120-157 supra.
201. In Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976), the Court held 6-3 that a state prisoner
is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was used against him at trial. Although the decision
primarily represents a refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to collateral proceedings
and a restriction of habeas corpus review, it also reflects the Burger Court's increasing
deference to state court adjudication of constitutional rights. Justice Powell explicitly rejected the prevalent mistrust of state court protection of individual rights. "Despite
differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there
now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and
appellate courts of the several states. State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and uphold federal law. . . . Moreover,
the argument that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional law
is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure claims, since they are
dealt with on a daily basis by trial level judges in both systems. In sum, there is 'no
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and the fragility of the doctrine's statutory base and case law development. 202
In moving away from the absolute no-exhaustion rule, the Court could
re-examine the legislative debates and conclude that the Framers in 1871
had intended to provide a federal forum only where state remedies were
inadequate or nonexistent. Such a conclusion would require the rejection of
Monroe's supplementary

remedy

analysis.23

Finding modern

conditions

different from those of the Reconstruction South, the Court could determine
that the absolute no-exhaustion rule is unjustified both as a matter of statutory
construction and policy.
If the remedy were then restricted to the three original purposes identified
in Monroe, the Court would in effect be adopting the deferral approach.2 14
As indicated earlier, this approach represents too great a diminution in the
role of the federal courts. Additionally, such a drastic revision of existing
federal jurisdiction would be legislative in character, and the Court should and
no doubt would eschew this approach to the exhaustion problem.
If the deferral approach were rejected, the Court could alternatively
require exhaustion of state remedies in all cases, whether the available remedy
was judicial or administraive. In judicial remedies cases, however, the burden
on plaintiffs of proving the unavailability or inadequacy of state remedies, or
the time consumed in exhausting them, is particularly onerous. Also, federal
courts would have to make threshhold determinations of the adequacy of
state remedies to decide whether to require exhaustion 20 5 - a particularly
delicate confrontation of the state and federal judicial systems.
In view of such difficulties, the Court should elect the intermediate course
of requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies if these remedies are
adequate.206 This approach would reduce federal-state friction in key areas
intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the [consideration of Fourth
Amendment claims] than his neighbor in the state courthouse.' " Id. at 3051-52 n.35.
202. See text accompanying notes 63-74 supra. The Court also demonstrated its deference
to state responsibility in Boehning v. State Employees Ass'n, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 168 (1976).
The Court reversed per curiam the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that a state employee
had been deprived of her constitutional rights when she was discharged without a pretermination hearing. The district court had elected to abstain on the ground that the
controlling but unconstrued state statute might require the pretermination hearing, and the
federal constitutional issue might thereby be avoided. The Seventh Circuit found nothing
in the state statute that supported the plaintiff's right to a pretermination hearing and
resolved the constitutional claim under §1983 in her favor. The Supreme Court felt
the statute was unclear and therefore upheld abstention, which required the plaintiff to
seek state court resolution of the statutory question. Justice Douglas dissented, noting
the continuation of the "strangulation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 that has recently been evident."
Id. at 170. For a detailed discussion of abstention and §1983, see McCormack, Federalism
and Section 1983: Limitations on the Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections,
Part II, 60 VA. L. REV. 250 (1974).
203. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
204. See text accompanying notes 190-93 supra.
205. See Chevigny, supra note 44, at 1356. For a discussion of the differences between
judicial and administrative remedies in the exhaustion context, see Note, supra note 69, at
1203-05.
206. The desirability of some change from the absolute no-exhaustion rule in the
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of state concern and competence such as prisons, education, welfare, and
licensing and would permit reliance on the developed body of administrative
exhaustion law. 20 7 While this would allow the states the initial opportunity
to redress alleged wrongs, the federal forum would be available once the
state administrative procedures were exhausted. Federal review of state administrative protection of individual rights would result in improved con20 S
sideration of such claims by the state agencies.
Exhaustion, of course, is a discretionary doctrine and would allow the
federal courts some flexibility in requiring initial resort to the state administrative remedy. Due to the nature of administrative adjudication, attention
would be focused on individual plaintiffs in important areas of state concern,
such as prisons, welfare, education, and licensing.20 9 Claims alleging racial discrimination or class-wide deprivation would not be subject to the exhaustion
requirement, since such claims have strong roots in the statute's history and
original purpose and are not the type of claims that are amenable to administrative resolution. Damage actions against the police would not be subject to
exhaustion since the plaintiff is seeking and deserves a judicial remedy. Some
reduction in the scope of jurisdiction in the police area should follow from
Paul's emphasis on separating state law torts from constitutional deprivations.

case of administrative remedies has been previously expressed or intimated in different
contexts. In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), a case decided the same day as Preiser,
the Court considered a §1983 challenge to a state license revocation. The Court's opinion
speculated on whether exhaustion should be required in such a case. Although exhaustion
of the state administrative procedure was not required, this brief intimation of a potential
departure from the absolute no-exhaustion rule drew quick responses from Justices Marshall
and Brennan, who indicated that the rule was "firmly settled by this Court's prior
decisions." 411 U.S. at 581.
One of the criticisms of the Court's announcement of the no-exhaustion doctrine in
McNeese was that the Court failed to consider a distinction between exhaustion in the
administrative, as opposed to the judicial, context. See note 73 supra. See also, K. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE 20.01, at 646 (Supp. 1970), cited in Aldisert, supra note 13,
at 565, for a discussion of the incongruity of requiring administrative exhaustion in the
case of federal prisoners but not in state prisoner cases. Justice Harlan, who dissented
in both McNeese and Dainico, was a strong critic of the no-exhaustion doctrine in
administrative cases. See 389 U.S. 416, 418 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
For a pro and con discussion of administrative exhaustion, which concludes that if
exhaustion is required, it is appropriate only in cases of individual deprivations, see Note,
supra note 69, at 1205-09.
20.01-.10 (1958); L.
207. See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISRATIVE LAW TREATISE
JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424-58 (1965). In Bishop v. Wood,
96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976), the Court, upholding the discharge of a policeman without a prior
hearing on the ground that the applicable state law created no protected property interest,
observed: "The Federal Court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies." Id. at 2080.
208. See Aldisert, supra note 13, at 563.
209. For an earlier proposal that administrative exhaustion should apply only to
individual claims, see Note, supra note 69, at 1205-09. Under this approach, Damico and
McNeese, which involved respectively claims of racial segregation in schools and a class
action complaint against the state welfare system, were correctly decided in terms of result.
Nevertheless, the criticism of the Court's decisional process in the two cases remains
valid. See text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
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The actual impact of an administrative exhaustion requirement on the caseload burden is difficult to assess, but a reduction in the prison context alone
2
would have a substantially beneficial effect.

10

None of the possible approaches to the no-exhaustion problem is without
difficulty, and the administrative exhaustion approach is not the extensive
reform some feel is necessary. But the question is how far the Court may
and should go in restricting the present scope of the remedy. The exhaustion
area represents the Court's best opportunity to begin to more adequately mold
the section 1983 remedy to the demands of federalism without overly restricting
the federal courts' role in the protection of individual rights against state
interference.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Immediately after the Court's decision in Paul, the chief counsel for the
American Civil Liberties Union characterized the Rizzo, Pachiman,21 and
Paul cases as indications that the Burger Court is "busy reversing the results
of the Civil War, and putting protection against illegal action back in the
hands of the states. ' ' 212 More accurately, the Court is beginning to remold
a broad piece of hastily enacted post-Civil War legislation to protect individual rights in the modern era. This retrenchment from previous expansive
analysis no doubt derives both from the Burger Court's philosophical orientation regarding federalism and from the pragmatic pressures of federal caseload burdens.
While the Court's beginning in Rizzo and Paul is significant, the lower
courts must implement the Court's analysis in particular cases. The Court
should provide more specific contours to the Rizzo and Paul analyses. In
attempting to further implement an accommodation between federalism and
individual rights, the Court should re-examine the absolute no-exhaustion
doctrine in section 1983 cases for the purpose of identifying classes of cases
that can be handled initially by the state systems. An immediate course
available to the Court, and one it should take, is to require exhaustion of
state administrative remedies in appropriate cases.
210. For a discussion of the differential impact of an exhaustion requirement as opposed
to a deferral approach on the actual caseload burden, see note 192 supra.
As an alternative to an administrative exhaustion requirement, the Court could review
Preiser and give full scope to its tentative exhaustion rationale by requiring exhaustion
in all prisoner cases. Prior to the Court's decision in Preiser,Judge Aldisert had recommended
that Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), the leading no-exhaustion case in the
prisoner context, be overruled by statute. Aldisert, supra note 13, at 576. Since prisoners'
§1983 complaints comprise the largest portion of total claims filed, a reduction of these
complaints would have a significant effect on reducing the total burden, as well as returning
to state control a critical area of state concern. Judge Aldisert also suggested that, in
addition to overruling the no-exhaustion rule in prisoner cases by statute, the statute
place limitations on the prisoners' access to federal court under §1983 after an adverse
administrative determination. Id. This suggestion effects a compromise between the deferral
approach and the exhaustion ,equirement in prisoner cases, depending on the stringency
of the limitations that would be adopted.
211. See note 199 supra.
212. Miami Herald, March "5, 1976, §A, at 2, col. 4.
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